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Post by quokka on Oct 30, 2012 21:06:20 GMT 9.5
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Post by edireland on Oct 31, 2012 1:30:50 GMT 9.5
Its very annoying as this means Hitachi are going to be commited to building part of a giant zoo of PWRs despite being a primary vendor for BWRs.
EDIT:
Oh wait, they are going to be building ABWRs?
Why no attempt to build ESBWRs instead?
It would seem to be a no brainer.
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peterc
Thermal Neutron
Posts: 30
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Post by peterc on Oct 31, 2012 6:32:39 GMT 9.5
At first blush, it looks very encouraging.
The ABWR reactor, if it really is to be that type seems to be a compromise between untested (in production) Gen IV stuff, and tried-and-tested PWR.
But wikipedia gives the ABWER reactor poor marks for operating factor. Some of the projects shown there also have worryingly long construction times.
Here's hoping!
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Post by quokka on Oct 31, 2012 7:31:56 GMT 9.5
WNN has a report: www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_Britain_to_have_boiling_water_reactors_3010121.htmlIt seems it will be ABWRs. I have read elsewhere that there is a European version of the ABWR that meets post Fukushima standards. There is no European version of the ESBWR currently which means extra delays if an ESBWR was proposed. WNN also reports that Hitachi says the construction times of the four existing Japanese ABWRs were between 36.9 and 43.2 months. |
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Post by LancedDendrite on Oct 31, 2012 7:52:12 GMT 9.5
Oh wait, they are going to be building ABWRs? Why no attempt to build ESBWRs instead? Because unlike the ESBWR, the ABWR is a completed design with US NRC design approval and a proven construction record. Simply put, it's got a better investment pitch because of those things alone. Remember, there's always an unbuilt reactor design out there that looks better than one that has already been constructed. I'd be happy with the ABWR for a place with so few seismic issues like Britain. |
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Post by edireland on Oct 31, 2012 12:55:45 GMT 9.5
Actually the ESBWR is more advanced in the General Design Approvals Process.... ie, it has been entered into said process. (And as I understand it the ESBWR is only a few months at most from being approved by the NRC as well, and it will take years to wrangle permission to actually start construction on the site anyway)
Its at step 3 in the GDA whereas ABWR has not been entered at all.
The passive safety advantages of the ESBWR are not what has sold me on the design compared to the ABWR, ti is the higher power nature of the design and its simplicity compared to the enormously complex ABWR, with its huge number of recirculation pumps and its multiple diesel generator backup systems.
All that gear is expensive.
I suppose those that ABWR is similar enough to the ESBWR that operating and construction experience from one will accrue to the other (indeed it appears many of the construction modules for the ESBWR are the same as the ABWR) but it appears we are going to end up with a zoo of different reactor types. (Atleast two, soon to become three if PRISM goes ahead)
This is going to cause huge increases in costs compared to the French model of picking one design and running with it.
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Post by LancedDendrite on Oct 31, 2012 17:26:31 GMT 9.5
It doesn't matter how much more complex it is, the ABWR has and is being built across the world. It is a far more sound investment decision for a large roll-out like Horizon compared to the ESBWR because it is not a paper reactor with precisely zero other clients. Even the AP1000 is more proven than the ESBWR.
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Post by edireland on Nov 1, 2012 1:30:34 GMT 9.5
It doesn't matter how much more complex it is, the ABWR has and is being built across the world. It is a far more sound investment decision for a large roll-out like Horizon compared to the ESBWR because it is not a paper reactor with precisely zero other clients. Even the AP1000 is more proven than the ESBWR. # Firstly six reactors is not really a "large" roll out by British and European standards, the AGR programme ran for 14 reactors and we all know how humongous the French PWR programme was. Secondly site preparation works for six ESBWR units have apparently commenced near Kovvada in India, which means the reactor would have atleast one other client. This would take it up to even to the six ABWR units I know being built or under construction in east Asia. Additionally it is a serious contender in the Okiluoto 4 competition, especially since the EPR appears to be repeatedly shooting itself the foot next door. The only reason to build ABWRs instead of ESBWRs is because there is no need to choose the cheaper and more efficient design because Horizon knows to an absolute certainty that the Government has become so commited to the glorious free market providing new nuclear that any attempt to do it itself would be an impossible ideological U-turn. This means they can work a cartel with EDF and charge as much as they want for nuclear electricity (currently the figure stands above $200/MWh) which removes all the normal competitive pressures that would drive them to suggest the very minor risk of building ESBWRs instead. |
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Post by proteos on Nov 1, 2012 8:57:39 GMT 9.5
I don't think the exact model to be built is that important. What's important is in how much time they will be able to build the plants and at which price.
The problem with the electricity market in the UK is that it is constrained by:
* the deregulation of the 80s. It is hard to backtrack to a command & control system like yesterday on the continent. Yet, as nothing has been done in anticipation of coal plant closures, a feeling of urgency grows.
* the EU is bent on competition in the power sector, when it is likely that it is a natural monopoly or at the very least prone to an oligopoly. Now that gas is not a long term option, investment costs are again paramount in this sector.
* carbon emissions are a factor, so operators don't what to build any facility without some assurance so long the lifetime is longer than 30 years or so. That means there is a big uncertainty for anything other than wind and solar PV whose lifetimes are lower. All other techs have longer lifetimes. Hence the very inflated prices: if nuclear must recoup its investment costs in the first 20 years when the plant is slated for a 60 year lifetime, the price of power shoots through the roof.
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Post by quokka on Nov 1, 2012 11:00:09 GMT 9.5
proteos,
The electricity market reforms is the UK are claimed to address some of the very real issues you raise. When the full details are made public, I think they will warrant careful scrutiny to see if they live up to the claims. At the moment it's still a bit uncertain, but I'd speculate that Hitachi have seen something they like.
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Post by LancedDendrite on Nov 1, 2012 13:18:47 GMT 9.5
* the EU is bent on competition in the power sector, when it is likely that it is a natural monopoly or at the very least prone to an oligopoly. You're half-right. Distribution networks (municipal grids that connect to consumers) are a natural monopoly, as it is highly inefficient to duplicate those sorts of networks. Transmission networks (connecting generators and load centres together) also tend towards being natural monopolies. However, it is quite possible (and has been proven) to have regulated generator markets with individual market generators acting as market participants as well as having unsynchronised grid interconnections included as 'virtual generators'. As long as you have good regulations for such markets you can quite easily bootstrap a little bit of capitalism into the industry. Retailers that buy electricity on behalf of consumers and bill them accordingly are another area of the market that can be deregulated, although the benefits of such markets are dubious (and I say that as a resident of a state with a quite deregulated electricity retail market). The fundamental issue facing such markets is access to large amounts of long-term (decadal time scale) credit. Traditionally this sort of credit has only been available to sovereign nations, but the advent of globalisation may be able to substitute for this. |
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Post by quokka on Nov 1, 2012 14:39:19 GMT 9.5
<blockquote>The fundamental issue facing such markets is access to large amounts of long-term (decadal time scale) credit. Traditionally this sort of credit has only been available to sovereign nations, but the advent of globalisation may be able to substitute for this.</blockquote>
I've thought for quite a while that one of the biggest pools of capital is pension and superannuation savings. I can see nothing wrong ethically with by law, compelling some portion of those savings to be used for construction of clean electricity capacity as long the investors are reasonably assured of a commercial rate of return. It could be seen as an obligation attached to the tax benefits of retirement saving.
Such investment could be either equity or debt, but the latter may be safer. It's just a vague notion, with some clear political difficulties but I can't see what's fundamentally wrong about it.
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Post by proteos on Nov 1, 2012 18:46:06 GMT 9.5
* the EU is bent on competition in the power sector, when it is likely that it is a natural monopoly or at the very least prone to an oligopoly. You're half-right. Distribution networks (municipal grids that connect to consumers) are a natural monopoly, as it is highly inefficient to duplicate those sorts of networks. Transmission networks (connecting generators and load centres together) also tend towards being natural monopolies. (...) The fundamental issue facing such markets is access to large amounts of long-term (decadal time scale) credit. Traditionally this sort of credit has only been available to sovereign nations, but the advent of globalisation may be able to substitute for this. I know that it is disputable that, bar networks, there's no proof that the power sector is a natural monopoly. But when investment costs rise with respect to fuel costs, an entity tends to muscle the other producers out. The cause of this is that the cash flow of this entity prevents others to compete. Only the entity (be it a firm or branch of state) with the biggest cash flow can invest big money. With more than one reactor or plant, they can start to reap economies of scale. In fact, the technology that is most favorable to competition is the gas turbine: it has low capital costs, thus the risks are relatively smaller. Nuclear is one of the least favorable to competition: not only is it a fixed costs industry, but the cost of one reactor is very high (and more so now than 30 or 40 years ago). I wouldn't be surprised if the UK would end up with only one nuclear operator a dozen years from now. And if nuclear is competitive against other techs such as gas/wind, the logic would be that it will represent the bulk of electricity supply. |
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Post by edireland on Nov 2, 2012 0:59:30 GMT 9.5
* the EU is bent on competition in the power sector, when it is likely that it is a natural monopoly or at the very least prone to an oligopoly. You're half-right. Distribution networks (municipal grids that connect to consumers) are a natural monopoly, as it is highly inefficient to duplicate those sorts of networks. Transmission networks (connecting generators and load centres together) also tend towards being natural monopolies. However, it is quite possible (and has been proven) to have regulated generator markets with individual market generators acting as market participants as well as having unsynchronised grid interconnections included as 'virtual generators'. As long as you have good regulations for such markets you can quite easily bootstrap a little bit of capitalism into the industry. Retailers that buy electricity on behalf of consumers and bill them accordingly are another area of the market that can be deregulated, although the benefits of such markets are dubious (and I say that as a resident of a state with a quite deregulated electricity retail market). The fundamental issue facing such markets is access to large amounts of long-term (decadal time scale) credit. Traditionally this sort of credit has only been available to sovereign nations, but the advent of globalisation may be able to substitute for this. The problem with "electricity markets" with such private generators is that you require huge amounts of surplus transmission capacity to support electricity being traded over long distances, and that you require an enormous customer control bureaucracy that decides which unit of electricity is being paid for by which company and when users switch companies they have teams of lawyers argue over everything to determine who pays for a particular day's use and other things that would be trivial in an integrated system. The net result is a system that is no more efficient than the original vertically integrated state owned one, but simply provides huge profits for various private equity funds which is the objective anyway. Without a retail market the wholesale market is pointless since why should they be forced to trade electricity with all the overheads concerned when they can simply generate more themsleves at a lower overall cost to themselves? This is especially true in the era of things like Solid State Ammonia Synthesis and electrolysis which promise an effective way to turn peaking power requirements into baseload capacity requirements. Additionally as stated above nuclear power is killed in the private sector because of the capital requirements that can only effectively be provided by state actors who have access to sufficiently long lengths of finance. The private sector just doesn't deal in 60 year duration loans, which is really what we need to make nuclear competitive. |
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Post by LancedDendrite on Nov 2, 2012 18:50:24 GMT 9.5
The problem with "electricity markets" with such private generators is that you require huge amounts of surplus transmission capacity to support electricity being traded over long distances, Surplus transmission capacity? Merchant generators often have to pay for connection to the grid and connecting load centres via long distance transmission lines increases system reliability. It's a simple question of economics that both private and government-owned utility companies have to deal with all the time. you require an enormous customer control bureaucracy that decides which unit of electricity is being paid for by which company and when users switch companies they have teams of lawyers argue over everything to determine who pays for a particular day's use and other things that would be trivial in an integrated system. There really aren't many differences between the Merit Order Dispatch system used at government-owned utilities and the traditional model used in deregulated electricity markets. A simple version of how it operates is this: - You have generators provide blind bids on how much a unit of power would cost to be generated and how much they have available at a coarse interval such as every hour or day. This is known as the marginal bidding price.
- The system operator dispatches the generators in order from cheapest to most expensive until demand is met at a fine interval, generally on the order of every 5 minutes or even less).
- Payments are made to all generators that are dispatched within that interval at a cost equal to the bid submitted by the last generator to be dispatched. So if the last generator to be dispatched submitted a bid of $35/MW, then all dispatched generators would be paid that price during that dispatch interval, even if some of the generators dispatched made a marginal bid of $10/MW.
The obvious question is how do you deal with ancillary issues such as reactive power support and frequency control. The answer is that generally they are taken care of with long-term contracts that are made outside of the market system. The net result is a system that is no more efficient than the original vertically integrated state owned one, but simply provides huge profits for various private equity funds which is the objective anyway. This is a rather crude generalisation. It all depends on how the market is constructed - in many cases, prices have gone down due to optimisations introduced by private companies. Without a retail market the wholesale market is pointless since why should they be forced to trade electricity with all the overheads concerned when they can simply generate more themselves at a lower overall cost to themselves? It isn't, really. It's about introducing competition to the electricity sector to drive down costs. Wholesale generation markets with government-owned distribution and transmission networks can work. A retail market (which essentially involves who charges customers and pays for the electricity they consume etc.) is optional. Additionally as stated above nuclear power is killed in the private sector because of the capital requirements that can only effectively be provided by state actors who have access to sufficiently long lengths of finance. The private sector just doesn't deal in 60 year duration loans, which is really what we need to make nuclear competitive. This directly conflicts with I've thought for quite a while that one of the biggest pools of capital is pension and superannuation savings Which I can attest actually happens. I have visited a power station that is in-fact majority owned by a superannuation fund (Newport Power Station in Melbourne, Australia). So the appropriate non-state actors exist, there probably just aren't enough of them. |
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Post by proteos on Nov 2, 2012 20:44:02 GMT 9.5
I agree with LancedDendrite that markets and vertical integration work about the same in the day to day dispatch. It's all a question of marginal price of power at generation level.
The difference has more to do with the interaction between grid operation and generation, like frequency adjustment, reserves, etc.
It is also notable that in sizeable countries, they have often been a few power producers, even in those which are famous for their monopolies. A kind of market has always been there, even without a nifty electronic exchange.
What really changes is that in a competitive market, capital costs are generally higher. But competitive firms tend to introduce optimizations to lower costs. The other point is that competitors will be more inclined to use new technologies as soon as they make economical sense. Hence the success of the combined cycle gas turbine in the UK, Spain, etc. which appears to me as the cheapest option in the 90s.
Markets are no miracle cure, there are plenty of ways to derail them. Examples of this are the feed in tariffs: when you have 30GW of wind and 30GW of solar PV who get paid out of market, a peak load of 90GW like in Germany, the market can't work as intended.
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Post by Nucular on Nov 3, 2012 2:44:00 GMT 9.5
Can the ABWR be considered Gen III+? Does it passive core cooling systems relying on natural circulation, like the AP1000 and ESBWR or is it simply a more resilient Gen II reactor, like the EPR? I know that the EPR is also considered Gen III by some people, but it lacks the passive core cooling systems found in other Gen III reactors and should thus be included with the Gen II bunch.
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Post by edireland on Nov 3, 2012 4:41:20 GMT 9.5
This is a rather crude generalisation. It all depends on how the market is constructed - in many cases, prices have gone down due to optimisations introduced by private companies. Perhaps, my only experience is the UK where it now appears that the reductions in electricity price at privatisation of the CEGB were purchased by cutting corners in grid renewals and allowing the grid to operate at closer to the failure point, as well as abandoning the state mandated nuclear programme in favour of the first "dash for gas". Now that the CEGB constructed infrastructure is nearing retirement we have National Grid panicking and demanding major increases in the transmission charge for the Supergrid because they haven't been spending enough on renewals for the last 15 years. It isn't, really. It's about introducing competition to the electricity sector to drive down costs. Wholesale generation markets with government-owned distribution and transmission networks can work. A retail market (which essentially involves who charges customers and pays for the electricity they consume etc.) is optional. Competition did work in the UK in the short term but now we have an absurdly overcomplex system with hordes of lawyers fighting over who pays for what and trying to blame failures on other people..... rather like the railways really. I am not convinced that the huge infrastructure required to support the market costs less than the supposed "inefficiencies" that would be introduced in a single vertically integrated operator (which could be kept under control, IMO, by something like the Freedom of Information Act which we already have). This directly conflicts with I've thought for quite a while that one of the biggest pools of capital is pension and superannuation savings Which I can attest actually happens. I have visited a power station that is in-fact majority owned by a superannuation fund (Newport Power Station in Melbourne, Australia). So the appropriate non-state actors exist, there probably just aren't enough of them. As far as I can tell Newport 'D' Power Station was constructed by the State Electricity Commission of Victoria. It was then sold to a variety of people before ending up in the hands of said Superannuation fund (as far as I can tell). As construction on the plant started in 1977 it is likely that it was sold off with a significant portion of its cost already deprecated, reducing both the length of the remaining loan (as the plant has used up substantial portions of its life) and the size of said loan per megawatt. As it is a gas fired station I would wager that it had a relatively low capital cost to begin with. This is not really comparable to taking out a loan to build, not purchase, a nuclear power plant with a huge capital cost and an at-least 60 year lifetime. Also, in respnse to the question about the ABWR, it is not a Gen III+ plant as it has no passive cooling system, it is merely a Gen III reactor with massively redundant active systems. |
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Post by quokka on Nov 3, 2012 12:17:03 GMT 9.5
"This is not really comparable to taking out a loan to build, not purchase, a nuclear power plant with a huge capital cost and an at-least 60 year lifetime." How do you like the sound of "nuclear bonds"?  Perhaps not quite yet. |
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Post by Nucular on Nov 4, 2012 18:28:40 GMT 9.5
I think all new builds should be Gen III+ designs with passive safety features. When the public realizes that the core doesn't immediately melt even if all active systems are disabled, it may boost support for further nuclear new build.
Neither the ABWR nor ESBWR are certified in the UK, so I hope they go for the latter.
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Post by Nucular on Nov 13, 2012 0:25:39 GMT 9.5
In addition to that the four ABWR's operating in Japan have proven to be rather unreliable, with the highest capacity factor only around 70%.
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Post by anonposter on Nov 13, 2012 11:28:59 GMT 9.5
In addition to that the four ABWR's operating in Japan have proven to be rather unreliable, with the highest capacity factor only around 70%. OTOH Japan's entire nuclear fleet has tended to have rather pitiful capacity factors by international standards. |
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Perhaps not quite yet.