Well... the
nuclear insurance industry doesn't count Chernobyl when evaluating liability risk for western plants for that very reason, so why should anyone else?
Its not a rhetorical question though, as other people do count Chernobyl for the reasons you go on to list. Here's the way I look at it.
A #1. Without a very rapid massive roll-out of
safe nuclear power this planet's climate is toast. Unreliable renewables and their co-requisite fossil backups are simply too complex and expensive
by themselves for the magnitude of the task at hand. Keep both very firmly in mind.
B. So. How to address your concerns: How do we both keep it safe, and make it massive?
1. Triage the patients;
list the worst emissions offenders:
1. China 23.5%
2. U.S 18.3%
3. E.U. 14%
4. India 5.8
5. Russia 5.7
6. Japan 4.0
7. Germany 2.6
8. Canada 1.8
9. Iran 1.7
10. U.K. 1.7
These Top Ten contribute 79% of global emissions. Then note France (75% of electricity from nuclear) hauls in at
number 18 on the list at 1.26%. Ukraine (50% nuclear electricity) is number 20 at 1.08%. I don't know if the E.U. figures double-count France and Germany, but that's not my point.
2. Visit
Country Profiles to see which of these already has commercial nuclear power program. Wait.. they
all do.
3. So do many of the alleged "third worlders" which appear to be of concern. Mexico. Turkey. Brazil. Argentina. Armenia, Romania, Pakistan. Pakistan even has atomic weapons. Poland and Jordan both have planned power reactors.
4. Realise the concern is a cultural one. "We" are "more advanced" and have a "much better" safety culture than any to which "they" could possibly aspire.
5. Oh wait. What about Japan? Or Russia? Or... US? The three nuclear accidents have all happened on the self-styled top-dogs' watch. Each can be at least partly attributed to regulatory failure:
a. The faulty pressure-relief valve indicator light problem was reported to NRC months before TMI by a sister plant who readily recognized the problem. NRC failed to spread the word, and it took critical hours for the TMI operators to figure it out.
b. The "positive scram effect" was similarly reported at an RMBK-1000 in Lithuania in 1985. The Soviet regulator and plant designer failed to spread the word. "Possibility too remote to matter." Heh.
c. The susceptibility of Fukushima Daiichi to 1000-year tsunami was recognized at least as early as 2006,and Tepco increased its seawall spec accordingly. It still wouldn't have been enough, but Japan's NISA failed to check if any corrective action had actually been taken. It hadn't. Its reasonably certain France's CEA would have shut down such a facility until proper remedial action was taken.
Each accident involved far more than this, of course, and do please read up at the
World Nuclear Association's library. But for me the most important take-home point is that "safety culture" is a very human endeavor, undertaken and constructed by humans acting in international concert. The lessons of TMI were hard-learned, though hardly as hard as they might have been. The Soviet RMBK-1000 power reactors ar Chernobyl were designed, constructed, regulated, and operated in cold-war isolation. One likes to hope they would have been different if there had been better collaboration with the west. Fukushima is harder. Those early Mk-I containments were known to be deficient, is why GE so rapidly advanced to MK-II and Mk-III designs. But the reactors themselves appear to have been robust enough, and there is always room for improvement. Where does one draw the line? Its not like you can just jack up a completed reactor and slide a new containment underneath.
On the other hand, the inadequate seawall, seawater-pump sealing, and stand-by generator siting were all items readily amenable to correction.
The Fukushima Daiichi reactors were designed in the early 1960's and came online in the early 1970's. TMI Unit 2 was nearly brand-new at the time of the 1979 partial meltdown. Conditions were nothing as extreme as at Fukushima: station power was never jeopardized and the only containment failure was a leaky waste-gas compressor. Even there secondary filtration prevented escape of everything save short-lived chemically and biologically inert Krypton and Xenon, which never posed a health hazard.
The health risk at Fukushima is similarly overestimated. There have been no radiation-related deaths or injuries, and none are anticipated.
But to answer your questions: No it is not likely and certainly not assured that new reactor designs will be deficient. One needs only consider the recycling of expertise between Westinghouse in the U.S. and Areva in the design selection and improvements for the French build-out that started thirty years ago. Desgnsflowed back and forth between Westinghouse and Areva (or its progenators), and subsequently back and forth between France and China for early Chinese designs, and finally the on-going collaboration between the three countries on the Gen-III AP1000-type reactors being built in China and the U.S. The key is collaboration and communication, and full involvement of IAEA and the national regulatory and oversight organizations. Think of it as a model of how to do this thing right.
Its not the only one. There's the French-Russian-Chinese collaboration (others are involved as well) on sodium fast reactors, with two scheduled for construction in China and two in Russia (Google BN-800 and BN-1200). But its Gen-III+ LWRs that will do the early lifting against climate change. U.K. Has signed agreement with EDF/Areva for two to four advanced EPR reactors, and is soliciting proposals from Russia's Rosatom and U.S. Westinghouse for their versions. Its an international design and construction community.
Construction of course is a bit different, as that is country and site specific. But standardization of international design leads to best-practices and least-error construction everywhere. See
China's nuclear project offers lessons for Vogtle expansion. It is important that IAEA be involved in an observation and advisory role, to make certain that corners are not cut on quality.
But the most important issue is that 80% o the worlds greenhouse emissions are from eleven countries that already have a well-established culture of safety and quality, and are in fact leaders in nuclear design and construction (U.S., China, Russia, India, France, Canada, Japan, U.K.) These countries have a long history of successful cooperation and collaboration, and two hard lessons earned when we failed. One way or another, anthropogenic global warming is a global problem requiring international cooperation for global solutions. Commercial nuclear power is but one of them, and probably not the most difficult.
The most difficult will be getting the world to agree to forego coal if the front-end capital cost of nuclear is not lowered sufficiently to beat it.